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COMMENTS
THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES ACT OF 1986:
BALANCING INVESTOR PROTECTION
WITH MARKET LIQUIDITY
The United States Department of the Treasury (the Treasury) may issue
interest-bearing securities' to borrow money in order for the United States
government to meet expenditures not covered by tax revenues.2 The Treas-
ury auctions these securities on a regular basis to government securities deal-
ers.3 By trading among themselves and in the retail market these dealers
distribute the Treasury debt.4 The government securities market5 is assured
1. 31 C.F.R. §§ 309.1, 340 (1986).
2. In 1985, the Treasury raised almost $1.2 trillion in this market to finance the budget
deficit and to refinance maturing debt. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. TREASURY SE-
CURITIES-THE MARKET'S STRUCTURE, RISKS, AND REGULATION 20 [hereinafter GAO RE-
PORT] (report prepared for the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm.
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)); see M. STIGUM, THE
MONEY MARKET 30-33 (rev. ed. 1983).
3. To sell marketable public debt, the Treasury, through the 12 Federal Reserve district
banks and their branches acting as fiscal agents for the United States, sells securities to the
public through a competitive auction process. 31 C.F.R. § 309.13 (1986). The Treasury auc-
tions three and six month Treasury bills to the public each week and fifty-two week bills every
four weeks. All bills carry a minimum denomination of $10,000. The Treasury sells its bills at
a discount from face value, and accepts the highest bids in terms of price. The Treasury also
auctions Treasury notes and bonds, which pay interest semiannually and mature in two to
thirty years. The Treasury sells notes and bonds on a regular schedule, with particulars about
each issue announced in advance to the public. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 10; see M.
STIGUM, supra note 2, at 431-34.
4. M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 440.
5. The government securities market is comprised of securities issued by the Treasury
(e.g., bonds, bills, notes) and by federal government agencies (e.g., Government National
Mortgage Association, Federal Home Loan Bank System, Federal National Mortgage Associ-
ation, and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association). See generally id. at 214-16. For the
purposes of this Note, however, "government securities" denotes Treasury issued securities
unless otherwise stated.
"The Treasury securities market is comprised of the cash market and the derivative markets.
The cash market is one in which outright ownership of particular securities is exchanged for
cash or in which securities are pledged as collateral for loans. Derivative markets involve
ownership of future rights or obligations of securities." GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 18; see
M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 30-31. Reference in this Note to the "Treasury securities market"
is solely to the cash market. The Treasury securities market contributes to the stability and
liquidity of the entire United States financial system. In fact, the "Treasury securities market
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a preeminent place among world securities markets because of its role in
effecting fiscal policy 6 as determined by the Treasury, and monetary policy7
as determined by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Federal Reserve Board or FRB). This market is also the largest securities
market in the world.' Government securities are guaranteed by the United
States,9 and therefore were exempted from regulation under the Securities
Act of 1933 (the Securities Act)' ° and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the Exchange Act).'" As a result, dealers engaged solely in the sale of gov-
ernment securities have been primarily unregulated at the federal level.' 2
In recent years tremendous investor losses have occurred in the govern-
is the single most important market for determining the structure of interest rates throughout
the economy." GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-12.
6. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board or
FRB) defines fiscal policy as "[g]overnment policy regarding taxation and spending." Federal
Reserve Glossary, 3 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 35,051, at 17,054 (May 1981).
7. Congress directed the FRB and the Federal Open Market Committee to maintain
long-run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates to ensure increased production, maxi-
mum employment, and price stability. 12 U.S.C. § 225a (1982). The FRB carries out its mon-
etary policy through its Open Market Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(FRBNY). By buying and selling Treasury securities, the FRB influences the growth of the
money supply and changes in market interest rates, and thus influences the direction of eco-
nomic activity. The federal government also uses the market to raise short-term funds to carry
out its day-to-day cash management activities. See S. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1986).
8. The market in U.S. government and agency securities is the largest and most efficient
securities market in the world. In 1984, the monthly trading volume of the 36 primary dealers
(as of Dec. 11, 1986, there were 40 primary dealers; see infra note 36) that report to the
Federal Reserve Bank amounted to over $1.5 trillion, which is approximately 15 times the
total volume of all transactions in corporate securities traded on all the nation's securities
exchanges and over-the-counter markets. 132 CONG. REC. H9253 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1986)
(statement of Rep. Wirth); see Request for Comments on the Oversight of the U.S. Govern-
ment and Agency Securities Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 21,959, 50 Fed. Reg. 15,905
(Apr. 23, 1985) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 21,959].
9. All Treasury securities are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.
However, because the "agency" security market includes a wide range of instruments and
issuers, some agency securities are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States and
some are not. See Failure of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman, A New Jersey Government Securities
Dealer: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1985) [hereinafter BBS
Hearing] (statement of E. Gerald Corrigan, President, FRBNY).
10. The Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982), provides, inter
alia, that "the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any of the following classes of
securities: . . . Any security issued or guaranteed by the United States." Id.
11. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(12) (1982)
[hereinafter Exchange Act], provides, inter alia, that exempted securities "include[s] securities
which are direct obligations of ... the United States." Id.
12. Both acts define government securities as exempt for purposes of their registration and
periodic reporting provisions. However, such transactions are not exempt from the antifraud
provisions of both acts. See In re Fidelity Financial Corporation and Fidelity Savings and
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ment securities market due to dealer failures. 3 Although the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) generally has regulatory authority over bro-
ker-dealers in corporate and municipal securities, and the FRB has regula-
tory authority over dealer banks, dealers who trade only in government
securities have operated outside the federal system of financial supervision.' 4
Most of these dealer failures occurred among dealers operating outside the
federal regulatory structure.'15
Alarmed by these losses, Congress enacted the Government Securities Act
of 1986 (the Act), 16 placing the government securities market under com-
plete federal regulation. In enacting this legislation, Congress amended the
Exchange Act by adding section 15C.'7 The basic goal of this section is to
close gaps in the regulation of the government securities dealers. 18 Congres-
sional concern in regulating this market was due in large part because this
market is directly tied to the national economy. 9 Congress feared that do-
mestic and foreign confidence in the United States financial system might be
threatened by continued dealer failures.2" Therefore, to ensure the integrity
and efficiency of this market, Congress brought all government securities
brokers and dealers under federal supervision. 2'
Paralleling the registration provisions for clearing agencies,22 and broker-
dealers in securities generally, the Act compels all unregistered government
securities brokers and dealers to register with the SEC. 23 The Act also re-
quires all currently registered brokers and dealers to file a notice with the
appropriate agencies. 24 The Act authorizes the Treasury, in consultation
with the SEC and FRB, to issue rules relating to financial responsibility,
recordkeeping, reporting, and financial statements rules.25 Such rules are
Loan Ass'n, Exchange Act Release No. 18,927, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,239 (July 30, 1982); see also SEC Release No. 21,959, supra note 8, at 15,906 n. 10.
13. Since 1982, investors have lost almost $900 million in this market because of dealer
failures. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
14. 132 CONG. REC. H9253 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1986) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
15. Id.
16. The Government Securities Act of 1986, § 1, Pub. L. No. 99-511, 100 Stat. 3208
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-5 (West Supp. 1987)).
17. This new § 15C follows § 15B (15 U.S.C. § 78o-4) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78o-5.
18. 132 CONG. REC. H9253 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1986) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
19. Id.
20. Id. at H9255 (statement of Rep. Luken).
21. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-5(a)(1)(A).
22. Clearing agencies, as defined in § 3(a)(23) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(23), must register pursuant to § 17A of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1.
23. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-5(a)(2).
24. Id. § 78o-5(a)(l)(B)(i).
25. Id. § 78o-5(b).
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intended to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices and to
protect both the integrity of the marketplace and investors in government
securities.2 6 To avoid duplicative rulemaking, the Act requires the Treasury
to consider the sufficiency of existing laws and rules of appropriate regula-
tory agencies 27 and permits the Treasury to develop classifications of regis-
trants and to exempt some of them.28 Congress believed, however, that
primary dealer status should not in itself be a sufficient reason for exempt
status.29
This Note will discuss the major participants and their roles in the govern-
ment securities market, including dealers, inter-dealer brokers, and regula-
tors. These participants actually make the market in government securities;
their roles, therefore, are integral to the distribution of the federal debt.
Next this Note will examine repurchase agreements, which are the primary
transaction through which dealers finance their positions in government se-
curities and are partly responsible for the high liquidity in this market.
However, through their use, dealers have also incurred enormous losses.
Accordingly, this Note will address both the role of repurchase agreements
in the market and the recent dealer failures. This Note will also address the
Act's legislative history to provide the background for a discussion of the
Act's regulatory provisions. No federal regulation can guarantee complete
protection from fraudulent practices in any securities market. This Note
will therefore offer strategies an investor can adopt to protect himself from
investment risks inherent in the market. Finally, because these provisions
are more preventive in nature than remedial, this Note will conclude by ex-
amining the effect the Act would have had in preventing the two most prom-
inent dealer failures.
I. MAKING MARKETS IN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
A. The Dealers and the Brokers
The dealer-participants in the government securities market include the
primary dealers, the inter-dealer brokers, and the secondary dealers. Pri-
mary dealers are those dealers with whom the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (FRBNY) conducts its monetary policy.30 The inter-dealer brokers
facilitate trades done among the primary dealers themselves in the wholesale
26. Id.
27. Id. § 78o-5(b)(3)(C).
28. Id. § 78o-5(a)(4), (b)(3)(A), (B).
29. 132 CONG. REC. H9253 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1986) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
30. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
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secondary market. 31 The secondary dealers are all the remaining dealers in
government securities."
The Treasury finances the federal debt through a competitive auction pro-
cess.33 The primary dealers purchase at auction about fifty-five percent of
the securities sold. They are designated primary dealers by virtue of their
"business relationship" with the FRBNY.34 In deciding whether to add a
dealer to its primary dealer list, the FRBNY looks at several factors, includ-
ing volume of market-making activity, financial strength of the firm, and
depth and experience of management to continue participating as a market-
maker." There are currently forty primary dealers.36 These dealers must
report their daily market activity in government securities to the FRBNY.37
The FRBNY expects primary dealers to stand ready to buy and sell govern-
ment securities even during adverse market conditions.38 By continually
making markets, primary dealers maintain the liquidity in government se-
curities for other investors. 39 These dealers also provide the FRBNY and
the Treasury with information on the types of new government securities
offerings that their customers will probably favor in the future.'
Although the primary dealers are the exclusive trading partners of the
FRBNY, they also trade in government securities among themselves and the
secondary dealers in the wholesale secondary market.4 1 Trading among the
primary dealers is done through inter-dealer brokers,4 2 rather than through
dealer-to-dealer trading. This method of trading is referred to as "blind bro-
31. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
34. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE SURVEY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM'S SU-
PERVISION OF THE TREASURY SECURITIES MARKET [hereinafter GAO SURVEY] (paper pre-
pared for the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1985)); see supra note 3.
35. Regulation of Government Securities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1985)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of E. Gerald Corrigan, President, FRBNY); BBS
Hearing, supra, note 9, at 162 (statement of E. Gerald Corrigan, President, FRBNY).
36. For a listing of the primary dealers, see List of Primary Dealers Reporting to the
Market Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Dec. 11, 1986).
37. GAO SURVEY, supra note 34, at 11.
38. See M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 431. The Treasury does not pay commissions to
dealers who make markets in Treasury securities. Dealers hope to cover their expenses by the
difference between the price they pay to the Treasury and the price they receive from resales to
their customers. GAO SURVEY, supra note 34, at 11.
39. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 26.
40. Id. at 23.
41. See generally Note, Lifting the Cloud of Uncertainty Over the Repo Market. Charac-
terization of Repos as Separate Purchases and Sales of Securities, 37 VAND. L. REV. 401 (1984).
42. See Quint, Big Five US. Securities Dealers, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1983, at Dl, col. 2;
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kering" '43 because the brokers display quotes on electronic screens without
displaying the source of the quotes." Thus, dealers "hitting a bid" through
these brokers do so without knowing the identity of the party on the other
side of the trade.45 The participants do know, of course, that they are deal-
ing with other primary dealers.46 This anonymity permits these dealers to
trade without disclosing the size of their trades or investment strategies.
47
Inter-dealer brokers, together with the primary dealers, comprise the largest
segment of the market for government securities.4
Secondary dealers include firms registered with the SEC, previously un-
registered firms, and banks.49 The approximate number of secondary deal-
ers is between 200 and 300."0 Although their exact numbers are unknown,
secondary dealers are by far the largest group of government securities deal-
ers. However, the trading volume of the secondary dealers is relatively low.
One FRBNY official has estimated their trading volume at roughly twenty-
five percent of total market activity, with the other seventy-five percent being
the trading volume of the primary dealers.5" Secondary dealers are not sub-
ject to direct FRBNY oversight.52 However, in early 1984, the FRBNY
requested that secondary dealers voluntarily submit position, transaction,
and financing data on a monthly basis in order to improve monitoring of the
market.
5 3
Bianco, Salomon Drops a Bomb on Bond Dealers, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 23, 1985, at 87, col.
2.
43. M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 316.
44. Letter from E. Gerald Corrigan to Sen. Alan Cranston (June 24, 1985), reprinted in
Senate Hearing, supra note 35, at 136.
45. M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 436.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 316.
48. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
49. Id. at 26.
50. The exact number of secondary dealers is not known, partly because a number of
them are not registered with any federal agency. Sources suggest, however, that there may be
as many as 400 to 500 firms. See Senate Hearing, supra note 35, at 54 (statement of E. Gerald
Corrigan, President, FRBNY); see also GAO SURVEY, supra note 34, at 12 (estimating 300
secondary dealers); GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 26 (estimating between 200 to 300 secon-
dary dealers); SEC Release No. 21,959, supra note 8, at 15,905 (estimating 200 secondary
dealers).
51. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 26.
52. Secondary dealers are not required to submit trading or financial data to the FRB and
are not subject to FRBNY dealer surveillance visits. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 26.
53. In providing the FRB with the dealers' positions and volume of transactions, these
reports were expected to assist the FRB in its routine monitoring of the market and help it
determine whether new regulations would be recommended. Statement Regarding New Re-
ports by Government Securities Dealers, FRBNY (Feb. 29, 1984), reprinted in BBS Hearing,
supra note 9, at 192-94.
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Secondary dealers provide a variety of services to the market. They help
the Treasury distribute debt by bidding at Treasury auctions for both their
customers' accounts and their own.54 They lower the search costs for inves-
tors by seeking the best prices available from primary dealers." They in-
crease liquidity and provide competition to primary dealers by quoting bid
and ask prices to customers.56 Finally, they open the market to smaller in-
vestors through consulting services.
7
B. Repurchase Agreements-The Primary Market Instrument
Both primary and secondary dealers often take trading positions that are
several hundred times their capital."8 The investment transaction that en-
ables these dealers to finance such positions is the repurchase agreement
(repo).59 As a result, repos have become the primary means of financing the
United States government securities market. 6° Although repos have spurred
the market's growth, they have also been the bane to many investors who did
not fully appreciate their inherent risks.6"
Repurchase agreements are a legitimate and integral part of the govern-
ment securities market. A repo uses securities as collateral to obtain funds.62
An investor who seeks cash, will temporarily sell his securities to an investor
who has cash, thus, in effect, providing the securities as collateral to obtain
the needed cash. 63 The investor obtaining the cash agrees to repurchase the
same or substantially the same securities at a specified point in the future,
and to pay interest on the use of the cash.'
A reverse repurchase agreement (reverse repo) is a mirror image of a repo
and may be used to obtain an interest return on available funds. 65 Thus, an
investor purchases securities and simultaneously agrees to sell them back at




58. See M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 40.
59. See Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983: Report of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1983) [hereinafter Judiciary Comm. Report].
60. Id. at 44.
61. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, IT'S 8:00 A.M., Do You KNOW WHERE
YOUR COLLATERAL Is? (1985) (This FRBNY informational pamphlet was issued to increase
investor awareness).
62. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 102.
63. Id.
64. See Amicus Curiae Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission, at 2-3, Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Securities Corp., 801 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1985) (Nos. 85-
7827, 85-7865, 85-7929).
65. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 102.
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a later time and at a higher price. In dealer parlance, a transaction is gener-
ally considered a repo when viewed from the perspective of the seller of the
securities and a reverse repo when viewed from the perspective of the pur-
chaser of the cash.66 Certain participants, notably savings and loans, invest-
ment companies, and the FRBNY, reverse the terminology, so that the
purchaser of funds is considered to be conducting a repurchase agreement.67
Repos are a vital cash management tool for state and municipal govern-
ments, financial institutions, and corporations. 68 Government securities
dealers finance their inventories through repos,69 and the FRB Open Market
Committee implements monetary policy through repo transactions entered
into by the FRBNY.7° The FRB not only uses repos to inject cash reserves
into the banking system to meet a temporary need, but it also uses reverse
repos to temporarily withdraw reserves from the banking system.71
There are basically two types of repo markets: wholesale repos and retail
repos.7 Typically, the wholesale repo is transacted in large denominations
between institutional investors, usually for a short period of time, often over-
night.7" Thus, dealers who must run highly leveraged operations use the
wholesale repo market to obtain short-term funds.7 4 The activities of the
FRBNY and the primary dealers are part of this market.
Retail repos frequently represent fractional interests in government securi-
ties." Since 1979, depository institutions have been required to issue retail
66. See M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 42. "What a given transaction is called depends on
who initiates it; typically, if a dealer hunting money does, it's a reverse." Id.
67. See Investment Company Act Release No. 10,666, 44 Fed. Reg 25,129 n.3 (Apr. 18,
1979).
68. See Judiciary Comm. Report, supra note 59, at 45.
Receipts of taxes and the proceeds of bond issues in the case of state and local gov-
ernments, cash flows from corporate operations and liquidity needs of thrift institu-
tions and money market funds often fail to coincide with the planned expenditures of
such funds, thereby creating the need for such entities to invest idle funds for short
periods in as risk-free manner as possible.
Id.
69. Id. at 46. "[T]he repo market has become the principal means of financing [dealers']
positions.... Repos also enable other dealers to obtain these newly-issued securities from the
Primary Dealers." Id.
70. Id. at 46 ("[T]he repo market plays an important role in the conduct of monetary
policy."); see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
71. See M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 240.
72. See generally Note, supra note 41, at 403.
73. See REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS AND FEDERAL FUNDS, FED. RESERVE BULL., May
1978, at 354 ("[Repos] are in general transacted for very short-term periods" and "[g]enerally
transacted in denominations of $5 million or more.").
74. See Note, supra note 41, at 404.
75. See Porter, Eighty-Nine-Day Agreements for the Sale and Repurchase of Fractional
Interests in Government Securities, 98 BANKING L.J. 343 (1983).
1006 [Vol. 36:999
The Government Securities Act of 1986
repos under certain FRB guidelines. 76 Accordingly, the FRB will recognize
those transactions in amounts under $100,000 and for terms of less than
ninety days to be retail repos.7 7 Although investors in wholesale repos are
institutional investors, investors in retail repos include a high percentage of
individual investors.78
C. The Regulatory Framework
Prior to the Act, no single federal agency had overall rulemaking or super-
visory authority over the government securities market. 79 The federal agen-
cies involved in regulating the participants included the FRB, the SEC, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC)."° The type of dealer being regulated determined
which federal agency, if any, had authority over it.8
All dealers in government securities fell into three general groups. One
group, was and continues to be, subject to full regulation by the SEC because
these dealers also trade in "nonexempt securities." 82 Though the SEC could
not prescribe rules directly governing the activities of government securities
dealers, it could enact rules for registered broker-dealers to "ensure the pro-
tection of customer accounts and to promote dealer responsibility." 3 Thus
the SEC, without a specific mandate to do so, could regulate a dealer's gov-
ernment securities transactions only within the context of the dealer's total
operations. 84
A second group of dealers was, and still is, regulated "because these deal-
ers are also banks or subsidiaries of bank holding companies."85 Regulatory
agencies include the OCC86 for national banks, the FRB for bank holding
companies and state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve Sys-
76. See 44 Fed. Reg. 46,438 (Aug. 8, 1979); see also Retail Repurchase Agreements-
Examination Guidelines, 3 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 35,253 (Apr. 16, 1982); Repurchase
Agreements-Retail and Wholesale, FRB Policy Letter, 3 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
1 35,252 (Apr. 13, 1982).
77. 44 Fed. Reg. 46,438 (Aug. 8, 1979); see 12 C.F.R. § 563.8-4 (1987).
78. See generally Note, supra note 41, at 405.
79. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 56-58.
80. See infra notes 86-88.
81. Exchange Act § 3(34), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (34).




86. Exchange Act § 3(34)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C)(i), (D)(i), (F)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(34)(A)(i),
(B)(i), (C)(i), (13)(i), (17)(i).
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tem, 7 and the FDIC for other, federally insured, state banks."8 The regula-
tory oversight of bank dealers focuses on the safety and soundness of the
banking industry as a whole.8 9
A third group of government securities dealers traded only in exempt se-
curities, was not involved in banking and therefore, not subject to any formal
regulatory oversight.9° These dealers were either separate entities not affili-
ated with a bank or were affiliated with a nonfinancial firm or a diversified
financial corporation.9 ' Nine of the primary dealers were included in this
group. Although primary dealers are "well vetted by the FED,"92 the
FRBNY readily admits that its relationship with the primary dealers is a
"business relationship rather than a regulatory one." 93 The FRBNY had no
express statutory authority over these dealers, but rather served an "infor-
mal watch-dog function... [with] some elements of traditional regulatory
functions.,,
94
D. Dealer Failures and Their Losses
From the group of unregulated government securities dealers came two of
the most recent and largest dealer failures in market history: ESM Govern-
ment Securities (ESM) and Bevill, Bresler & Schulman (BBS). ESM failed
in 1985 with losses that have been estimated at $300 million, making it the
largest failure in market history.95 A month after ESM was forced into re-
87. Exchange Act § 3(34)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (F)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(34)(A)(ii),
(B)(ii), (C)(ii), (O)(ii), (F7)(ii).
88. Exchange Act § 3(34)(A)(iii), (B)(iii), (C)(iii), (D)(iii), (F)(iii), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(34)(A)(iii), (B)(iii), (C)(iii), (D)(iii), (F)(iii).
89. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 60.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 436-37.
93. Senate Hearing, supra note 35, at 62 (statement of E. Gerald Corrigan, President,
FRBNY).
94. Id. at 63. The Act requires formal registration of all dealers, including the primary
dealers. See § 102(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-5(a)(1)(A).
95. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT [hereinafter SEC REPORT], re-
printed in Regulating Government Securities Dealers.- Hearings on H.R. 2032 Before the Sub-
comm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1985) [hereinafter House Hearings]; The
following is a list of dealer failures or near failures occuring within the past 10 years: Winters
Government Securities, Inc. (1977); Hibbard & O'Conner Government Securities, Inc. (1982);
Drysdale Government Securities, Inc. (1982); Comark, Inc. (1982); Lombard-Wall, Inc.
(1982); Lion Capital Group, Inc. (1984); RTD Securities, Inc. (1984); ESM Government Se-
curities, Inc. (1985); Bevill, Bresler Schulman Asset Management Corp. (1985); Parr Securities
Corp. (1985); Brokers Capital, Inc. (1985); Midwest Government Securities, Inc. (1985); Col-
lins Government Securities, Inc. (1985). See Reauthorizations for the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 1986-88: Hearing on S. 919 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
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ceivership, BBS collapsed, having incurred losses of up to $235 million.96
Many small institutional investors such as municipalities, school boards, and
thrift institutions suffered as a result of these failures.97 These well-publi-
cized failures have not only made this "gentleman's market"98 more well
known to the average person, but they have also brought an end to Congress'
laissez-faire approach to the market's regulation.99
ESM Government Securities, Inc. (GSI) acquired securities, in part,
through unsecured borrowing and then used these securities to enter into
repurchase agreements and other transactions to achieve trading gains."
By speculating incorrectly on interest rate movements, GSI had acquired
millions of dollars in losses.' 1 Much of these losses were absorbed by the
parent firm, ESM Group, Inc., thus hiding the losses from the clients of
GSI.' °2 ESM Group, Inc. in turn transferred these losses to an affiliate,
ESM Financial Group, Inc. (Financial)." 3 GSI's books did not show any
transaction losses while the books of the parent company hid the loss
amount as inter-company loans." ° Financial owed GSI $200 million but
had assets of only $50 million, which resulted in GSI's inability to repay
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1985) [hereinafter
Reauthorizations] (listing the dollar amount of some of these failures); BBS Hearing, supra
note 9, at 80.
96. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 150.
97. Two such municipalities were the City of Beaumont, Texas, which incurred losses of
up to $64 million, and the City of Pompano Beach, Florida, whose losses are estimated to be
$11.9 million. Seven school districts in New York incurred losses of $7 million, leaving them
without sufficient funds for the school year. See Reauthorizations, supra note 95, at 3 (state-
ment of Sen. D'Amato); see also Letter from Danny 0. Crew to the SEC (May 17, 1985)
(comment letter to the SEC from the Assistant City Manager of Pompano Beach, Florida).
98. Trading in this market is conducted in an "environment of sophisticated investors
who trade hundreds of millions of... dollars on the basis of a 'gentleman's agreement' with an
entity about which they couldn't care less." SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 484 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). See M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 437 ("It is inconceivable that any of these firms would
ever renege on a trade. In a market that operates on the principal (sic] my word is my bond,
no dealer could afford the damage that reneging on a trade would do to its reputation.")
99. Throughout the hearings on the Act, many commentators asserted that little regula-
tion is the best regulation for this market. The SEC, in its report to Congress, stated "if
legislation is to be adopted, the Commission would recommend only legislation drafted nar-
rowly to address areas in which there have been demonstrated abuses." See SEC REPORT,
supra note 95, at 228.
100. RECEIVER REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE ESM COMPANIES, SEC v. ESM
GROUP, No. 85-6190 (S.D. Fla. 1985) [hereinafter RECEIVER REPORT]; see Sterngold, Report
Cites ES.M Methods, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1985, at D9, col. 4.
101. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 149.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See RECEIVER REPORT, supra note 100, at 43.
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about $300 million owed to its customers. 105
The BBS affair actually involved two separate entities, Bevill, Bresler &
Schulman, Asset Management Corporation (AMC), an unregulated govern-
ment securities dealer, and Bevill, Bresler & Schulman, Inc. (BBS, Inc.), a
registered broker-dealer. BBS, Inc. had been voluntarily reporting its posi-
tions under the FRB capital guidelines on a monthly basis. However, the
BBS, Inc. reports did not reflect the activities of its related firms where the
losses actually occurred.'0 6 The fact that BBS, Inc. was a registered broker-
dealer did not help prevent its loss because its unregistered affiliate, AMC,
was carrying on government securities activities not subject to federal regu-
lation."°7 Because of the inter-relation of these two firms, the failure of the
nonregistered dealer precipitated the fall of the registered broker-dealer.' 0 8
II. THE HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION AND ITS OUTCOME
A. Congressional Concerns and the New Law
Many of the failed dealers operated outside the federal regulatory struc-
ture because they dealt solely in exempt government securities. As a result
of these failures, many savings and loans, municipalities, and other public
institutions lost millions of dollars.'0 9 In response to these dealer failures,
Congress sought to provide for a formal system of regulation of government
securities dealers and brokers by enacting the Government Securities Act of
1986.1°
The Act directs the Secretary of the Treasury to adopt rules to ensure that
all government securities dealers operate with adequate capital,11' and ac-
count for and maintain customers' funds and securities." 2 The Treasury
105. See Vise, Receiver Cites Warner Role in E.S.M. Failure, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1985, at
Fl, col. 5.
106. BBS Hearing, supra note 9, at 4-26 (statement by Saul S. Cohen, Trustee).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 97.
110. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-5.
111. Id. § 78o-5(b)(1)(A). The lack of adequate capitalization of dealers in the government
securities market has been a significant problem; the largest failures have involved dealers that
operated for substantial periods of time while insolvent. Commentators to an SEC request also
raised concerns regarding the need for limitations on the levels of risk and leverage taken on by
government securities dealers. SEC REPORT, supra note 95, at 230.
112. Under the Act, the Treasury may promulgate rules relating to custody and use of
customers' deposits or credit balances; transfer and control of government securities subject to
reps and similar transactions. In promulgating such rules, the Treasury will establish stan-
dards for the safeguarding and use of customer securities held by a nondealer depository insti-
tution as a fiduciary or in a similar capacity. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-5(b)(l)(A).
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must also promulgate recordkeeping rules and regulations 1 3 directly affect-
ing market safety, such as collateralization of repurchase agreements." 14 In
addition, the law requires that dealers register with or notify designated fed-
eral agencies' 5 that they deal in government securities.'6
B. Regulation-A Panacea or a Problem?
In formulating the legislation, Congress addressed the threshold question
of whether regulation was actually needed. The government securities mar-
ket is made up of institutional investors, who, under nonexempt securities
concepts, would not ordinarily require the protection of federal law given to
less sophisticated investors.' 1 7 Because of this market's sensitivity to any
regulation, Congress was cautious in interposing federal regulation where
some argued that it has the potential to create more harm than good." 8 In
addition to those critics who believed that the federal government should
maintain its laissez-faire approach in this area, there were others who, while
agreeing that some regulation was needed, advised Congress to enact nar-
rowly tailored legislation." 9
Many of the participants in this market supported the need for some regu-
113. Id. § 78o-5(b), (c). The accounting profession had been criticized for falling down on
its auditing responsibilities in the wake of the ESM and BBS collapses. See Klott, Auditors
Criticized in House, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1985, at D7, col. 1; Berton, Accountants Seek to
Tighten Auditing of Government Transactions, Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 1985, at 8, col. 1. Though
the Act does not specifically call for auditing rules, the Treasury has already agreed to the need
for such rules. 132 CONG. REC. H9250 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1986) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
114. 132 CONG. REC. H9250 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1986) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
115. Under the Act these agencies will be the OCC in the case of a national bank; the FRB
in the case of a state member bank of the Federal Reserve System; the FDIC in the case of a
bank insured by the FDIC (other than a member of the Federal Reserve System or a federal
bank); the FHLBB in the case of a federal savings and loan association and federal savings
banks; the FSLIC in the case of an institution insured by the FSLIC (other than a federal
savings and loan association, or federal savings bank); and the SEC in the case of all other
government securities brokers and government securities dealers. Government Securities Act
of 1986, § 102(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(34)(G) (West Supp. 1987).
116. Government securities are not "exempted securities" for the purposes of § 17A of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Government Securities Act of 1986, § 102(a), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78c(a)(12)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1987).
117. See SEC REPORT, supra note 95, at 227; House Hearings, supra note 95, at 374 (state-
ment of John R. Shad, Chairman, SEC) ("[The ... market we are talking about is a profes-
sional market where by and large, all the parties have professional advice and assistance."); see
also supra note 57.
118. Rules that would make government securities harder to sell or add substantial costs to
dealers would cause interest rates to rise. An increase of just one-tenth of a percentage point in
the interest rate would cost the Treasury $1 billion a year. See Worthy, The Troubled Market
in Federal Securities, FORTUNE, May 13, 1985, at 81.
119. See generally SEC REPORT, supra note 95, at 302 (summary of SEC public forum on
Government Securities Market, May 21, 1985).
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lation. 12' Despite their earlier positions, support for such legislation even
came from the government agencies most affected by the Act. 121 Many par-
ticipants sought greater regulation to maintain the integrity of the market
and, therefore, to increase its liquidity.'2 2 Oddly, a fear of reduced market
liquidity caused other market participants to oppose regulation, claiming
that the market will correct itself.123 However, this position offers nothing
in the way of preventive action.124 Future problems are not adequately ad-
dressed merely because the market has been able to adjust to current
problems. As one SEC Commissioner stated, ad hoc corrections would not
allow for flexible responses, let alone encourage smooth and efficient market
operations. 1
2 5
Market participants were also concerned about investors' confidence in
the market. Investor confidence is especially crucial in the government se-
curities market, because of the system of blind-brokering. '26 The system en-
ables billions of dollars to be traded daily with nothing more than a simple
promise from a voice at the end of the telephone.127 The integrity and hon-
esty of one's trading counterpart are, therefore, important elements of this
market. Lack of confidence in the financial soundness of firms operating in
the market can be costly to the Treasury if it translates into higher interest
rates. 128 On the other hand, regulation that would require dealers to keep
120. See SEC Release No. 21,959, supra note 8, at 15,904. The majority of responses to the
SEC release supported some form of regulation of the government securities markets. Of the
79 comment letters received by the SEC, 56 supported some form of regulation for the govern-
ment and agency securities markets, 12 opposed any form of further regulation, and 11 ex-
pressed no opinion. SEC REPORT, supra note 95, at 291; see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
U.S. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES, DEALER VIEWS ON MARKET OPERATIONS AND FEDERAL
RESERVE OVERSIGHT 3 (fact sheet prepared for the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy
of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)).
121. See House Hearings, supra note 95, at 429 (statement of Paul Volker, Chairman,
FRB); Debt Units Facing New Rules, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1985, at DI, col. 3 (statement of
FRB governor in charge of bank regulation suggesting "something has to be done"); 132
CONG. REC. H9250 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1986) (statement by Rep. Dingell).
122. See House Hearings, supra note 95, at 90, 109, 134.
123. See id. at 350 (statement of John J. Niehenke, Acting Assistant Secretary, Treasury).
124. A purely voluntary surveillance approach "cannot be counted on to minimize fraudu-
lent behavior or excessive risk-taking at the expense of third parties." House Hearings, supra
note 95, at 430 (statement of Paul A. Volker, Chairman, FRB).
125. See id. at 312 (statement of Aulana L. Peters, Commissioner, SEC).
126. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
128. House Hearings, supra note 95, at 437 (statement of Paul Volker, Chairman, FRB)
("[T]he danger here.., is that one could imagine circumstances in which confidence in market
practices and in the dealers themselves was impaired to the point that it would affect the
liquidity of the market and, therefore, affect interest costs."). But see id. at 353 (statement of
John J. Niehenke, Acting Assistant Secretary, Treasury) (recent dealer failures have not had a
discernible effect on Treasury yields).
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excessive amounts of capital as a cushion for their customers, instead of be-
ing used to finance their positions, can be equally costly.' 29
C The Treasury is Granted Overall Authority
The original House bill called for a primarily self-regulatory organiza-
tion.'3° This bill would have created the Government Securities Rulemak-
ing Board, similar to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the
Board).' 3 ' The FRB would have been authorized to appoint a nine-member
board comprised of primary and secondary government securities dealers as
well as individuals not associated with the industry.' 32 The bill would have
given the FRB primary oversight and authority to enforce the Board's
rules. 133 Furthermore, the Board would have been authorized to establish
recordkeeping, registration and financial responsibility requirements.
134
Both the Treasury and the SEC objected to this bill, preferring to see the
Treasury accomplish the same goals through use of its existing rulemaking
power. 13- Ultimately, the amended bill established the Treasury as the over-
all rulemaking authority and was then passed by both houses of Congress. 
136
Congress authorized the Treasury to develop regulations that best serve
both the marketplace and the investor. 137 Nevertheless, granting the Treas-
ury this authority was not done without serious objection. 138 The Treasury
was accused of being a "johnny-come-lately" 139 to the market's problems.
The Treasury's doubt over the need for regulation"4 led one congressional
leader to remark on the Treasury's lack of enthusiasm in regulating this mar-
129. See Molinari & Kibler, Broker-Dealers' Financial Responsibility Under the Uniform
Net Capital Rules-A Case for Liquidity, 72 GEO. L.J. 1, 34 (1983).
130. H.R. 2032, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H7479 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1985).
131. Id. at H7480; see Exchange Act § 15B(b)(1) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
4(B)(1)).
132. H.R. 2032, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H7479-80 (daily ed. Sept. 17,
1985).
133. Id. at H7479.
134. Id. at H7480.
135. See House Hearings, supra note 95, at 412 (statement of John J. Niehenke, Acting
Assistant Secretary, Treasury).
136. The Government Securities Act of 1986, § 1, Pub. L. No. 99-571, 100 Stat. 3208
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-5); see 132 CONG. REC. H9250-51 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1986)
(statement of Rep. Dingell).
137. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-5(b)(2)(A), (B).
138. 132 CONG. REC. H9253 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1986) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
139. 41 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 278 (1985) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
140. The Treasury opposed this regulation because of the adequacy of existing market self-
correcting mechanisms, possible ill effects upon debt financing costs, and possible overlapping
of regulatory responsibilities among federal agencies. House Hearings, supra note 95, at 350-51
(statement of John J. Niehenke, Acting Assistant Secretary, Treasury).
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ket.' Other Congressmen questioned the Treasury's selection as the
rulemaking authority because of the "business relationship"' 4 2 between the
FRBNY, the Treasury and the primary dealers. 143 These opponents recog-
nized a potential conflict of interest, which could affect the Treasury's ability
to regulate the market effectively.
144
Nevertheless, the legislation's ultimate goal of preventing losses resulting
from dealer failures can be achieved by the current policies of the Treasury
and the Act. The Treasury, in opening up its book-entry system, will pro-
vide safekeeping of securities to more participants at a lower cost to the
investor. 4 5 Under the Act, the Treasury must promulgate its rules in con-
sultation with the SEC and the FRBNY. 46 These three agencies currently
work together closely, and there is no reason to doubt their continued
relationship.
III. RESTORING MARKET INTEGRITY THROUGH
INCREASED REGULATION
A. Registration and Disclosure Requirements
The Act brings all government securities dealers under the aegis of federal
regulation by requiring them to register with appropriate regulatory agen-
cies. 147 For example, the nine unregulated primary dealers must register
with the FRBNY, 148 while the unregulated secondary dealers are required
to register with the SEC.149 The SEC's registration requirements ensure that
141. 41 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 277 (1985) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
142. See House Hearings, supra note 95, at 176, 413, 427; see also Senate Hearing, supra
note 35, at 62 (statement of E. Gerald Corrigan, President, FRBNY).
143. See House Hearings, supra note 95, at 197 (statement of Rep. Rinaldo) (questioning
the appropriateness of vesting the Treasury, as seller of Treasury securities, with the rulemak-
ing authority).
144. Id. One Congressman likened it to "putting a madam in charge of a vice squad." Id.
at 413 (statement of Rep. Swift).
145. In July of 1986, new issues of Treasury securities became available only in book-entry
form, thereby eliminating definitive registered securities. Id. at 363. Furthermore, the Treas-
ury is considering expanding its commercial book-entry system to provide access by all Treas-
ury securities dealers to direct securities accounts at the Federal Reserve. Currently only
depository institutions have direct access to these book-entry accounts. Id. at 364-65.
146. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-5(b)(3)(D).
147. Id. §§ 78c(a)(34)(G); 78o-5(a)(l)(A),(B).
148. "Generally, the appropriate regulatory agency for a financial institution is that institu-
tion's federal supervisory agency ...." 52 Fed. Reg. 19,642, n.5 (1987).
149. Id; see 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78c(a)(34)(G), 78o-5(a)(2). To implement these provisions, the
SEC adopted rules prescribing the form and information required to be filed by a government
securities broker-dealer in its application for registration with the SEC. Revision to Form BD,
52 Fed. Reg. 16,833 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249).
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the securities market operates in a fair and orderly manner. 15o Additionally,
registration allows the SEC to monitor broker-dealer compliance with its
bookkeeping, recordkeeping, periodic financial reporting, and financial re-
sponsibility rules.15' This reporting system enables the SEC to find viola-
tions of financial and related rules at an early stage. Self-regulatory
organizations, such as the National Association of Securities Dealers for reg-
istered broker-dealers, can also respond with disciplinary proceedings in the
event a dealer fails to conform to the rules.152 Under the Act, previously
unregistered government securities dealers must register with the SEC but
follow rules promulgated by the Treasury. 5 3
The Act's requirement of broker-dealer registration is intended to protect
the individual investor. Congress found that despite the institutional nature
of the broker-dealers there were many participants in the market who would
benefit from the additional registration and oversight provisions. 154 Secon-
dary dealers sometimes trade with inexperienced investors entrusted with
large public funds. 155 Without this legislation, such investors might seek out
"higher quality" firms, or drop out of the market all together. 56 Increased
surveillance by federal agencies and greater registration requirements placed
upon the dealers will create a safer market for participants. The amount of
risk to which an investor will be exposed should decrease. Nevertheless,
150. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, WHAT EVERY INVESTOR SHOULD
KNOW: A HANDBOOK FROM THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 6 (Feb.
1986) [hereinafter SEC HANDBOOK].
151. REPORT OF THE JOINT TREASURY-SEC-FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STUDY OF THE
GOVERNMENT-RELATED SECURITIES MARKETS (Dec. 1980), reprinted in BBS Hearing, supra
note 9, at 800 [hereinafter JOINT REPORT].
152. Id. at 803.
153. 132 CONG. REC. H9251 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1986).
154. Id. at H9252 (Summary of Treasury Book-Entry Proposal); see House Hearings, supra
note 95, at 79.
155. For example, in Clallum County, Washington, which lost $10 million in the ESM
failure, the treasurer was a dairyman. These investors may require greater protection than the
"typical Wall Street sophisticate." House Hearings, supra note 95, at 79 (statement of Rep.
Swift). The SEC in its request for comments, also questioned whether the traditional presump-
tion of sophistication of those investors with significant assets is applicable to investors in the
government securities market. SEC Release No. 21,959, supra note 8, at 15,912.
156. Some secondary dealers feared that investors were choosing to deal only with primary
dealers on the assumption that they were regulated by the FRB. See TRANSCRIPT OF THE
COMMISSION'S PUBLIC FORUM ON GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKETS, May 21, 1985, at
143 (statement of Stephen Barrett, Managing Director, Alex Brown & Co.) [hereinafter COM-
MISSION'S PUBLIC FORUM]. Ultimately, this "flight to quality" could adversely affect the li-
quidity of the government securities market. See id. at 223 (statement of Edward Geng, Senior
Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York). See generally Ross, Shad Predicts More
Securities Failures, Wash. Post, Apr. 18, 1985, at B3, col. 4; Big Treasurys Investors Become
More Careful After Two Firms Fail, Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1985, at 1, col. 5; Quint, When Little
Guys Buy Treasury Debt, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1983, at CIO, col. 3.
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firms and their customers will continue to be exposed to some market, credit,
and other risks. '"7
B. Maintaining Adequate Capital and Customer Accounts
The Act also requires dealers to operate with adequate capital and to ac-
count for and maintain customers' funds and securities.' 5 Net capital rules,
similar to those of the SEC,15 9 ensure that firms operate with sufficient li-
quidity "to cover their current indebtedness to their customers and enable
the dealers to satisfy custome[r] claims for cash or securities."'" ° The SEC's
net capital rule prohibits broker-dealers from incurring indebtedness in ex-
cess of 1500% of their net capital. 161 The SEC rules also allow an alterna-
tive that ties the broker-dealer's net capital to customer receivables rather
than liabilities. 162 This alternative rule allows broker-dealers to maintain net
capital equal to the greater of $100,000 or two percent of total debit items. 1
6
Similarly, the FRB requested in April of 1985, that unregulated firms main-
tain liquid capital equal to 1.2 times their estimated potential losses from
sudden price changes. 16' The FRB also announced the policy behind its
157. BBS Hearing, supra note 9, at 106 (statement of John R. Shad, Chairman, SEC) ("The
market risk depends on the fluctuations in interest rates. The credit risk depends on the repu-
tation, credit worthiness and financial condition of the other party to the transaction, whether
adequate collateral is obtained, the concentration of dealings with the contra-party, and the
receipt of adequate margin."); see AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNT-
ANTS REPORT OF THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON AUDITS OF REPURCHASE SECURITIES
TRANSACTIONS, reprinted in BBS Hearing, supra note 9, at 932.
158. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-5(b)(l)(A). In this connection, the SEC amended its financial re-
sponsibility rules with respect to its net capital, recordkeeping and quarterly securities count
rules. Financial Responsibility Rules, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,295 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240).
159. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1987).
160. See JOINT REPORT, supra note 151, at 786.
161. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c34(a) (1987).
162. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(f) (1987); Adoption of Alternative Net Capital Requirement,
Exchange Act Release No. 11,497, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
80,212 (June 26, 1975); see Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 21,651 [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,726 (Jan. 11, 1985).
163. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(f) (1987). The SEC has amended its net capital requirements
with respect to the excess margin held by broker-dealers in reverse repos. The rule requires
broker-dealers to increase this net capital by 10% of the excess market value of Treasury
securities subject to reverse repos with any one party over 105% of the contract price. This
105% parameter only applies to reverse repos using Treasury securities; the parameter is
110% for mortgage backed securities and 120% for other securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-
l(a)(9) (1987); see Financial Responsibility Rules, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,295, 22,297 (1987) (release
announcing adoption of amendments to the net capital rule) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240).
164. Capital Maintenance Rules, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,057 (1985) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 208,
225, 263 (1987)).
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capital adequacy standards as "providing additional protection against un-
foreseen losses, helping to maintain public confidence in particular institu-
tions and in the banking system, partially protecting depositors from a threat
of insolvency, and supporting reasonable growth of such institutions.' ' 165
In announcing its proposed net capital requirements, the Treasury
modeled its rule after the FRBNY's rule. 166 The Treasury believes the
FRBNY rule, as opposed to the SEC rule, is better suited for broker-dealers
solely in government securities because it "recognizes certain types of risk as
well as risk mitigating hedging techniques."'' 67 The Treasury's temporary
rule requires government securities broker-dealers to maintain liquid capital
at least equal to 120% of total "haircuts" 16' and in no case of an amount less
than $25,000.169
Maintaining customers' funds and securities can be done simply by keep-
ing segregated accounts.' 70  Rules relating to segregation of accounts are
currently used by registered broker-dealers. 17 1 Broker-dealers either hold
the securities in segregated accounts at their clearing bank or they merely
earmark the customers' securities on their own books. 1 72 Hold-in-custody
arrangements are more prevalent, however, with physical securities rather
than the book-entry type.1
73
In order to protect an investor in these hold-in-custody arrangements, one
commentator urged the adoption of a rule similar to the SEC's customer
protection rule.174 This rule requires that broker-dealers obtain and main-
tain possession or control of all customer fully paid and excess margin secur-
165. Capital Maintenance, Federal Reserve Bank Release, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,317 (1984)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 208, 225, 263 (1987)).
166. Implementing Regulations, 52 Fed. Reg. 5661 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 402.2) (proposed Feb. 25, 1987).
167. Id.
168. A "haircut" is a requirement that a broker-dealer reduce the value of securities on its
balance sheets to reflect the risk of loss associated with those securities. M. THOMSETr, IN-
VESTMENT AND SECURITIES DICTIONARY 125 (1986); see M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 700.
169. Temporary Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,688 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 402.2)
(effective May 26, 1987). The Treasury announced its intention to change the temporary rules
only in response to comments demonstrating "serious and widespread operational difficulties
in [their] implement[ation]." Id. at 19,643.
170. Letter from Goldman, Sachs & Co. to the SEC (May 17, 1987) (response letter sup-
porting segregation by the dealer); but see Letter from Irving Trust to the SEC (May 17, 1987)
(response letter preferring to take possession or to enter into custodial agreements).
171. See Letter from Goldman, Sachs & Co. to Rep. Wirth (June 7, 1985), reprinted in
House Hearings, supra note 95, at 514.
172. BBS Hearing, supra note 9, at 257 (statement of E. Gerald Corrigan, President,
FRBNY).
173. Id. at 258.
174. Letter from Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 170 (favoring the adoption of a SEC-
type customer protection rule).
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ities, and that broker-dealers maintain records properly identifying the
owner of all customer securities they hold.175 The Treasury's temporary
rule does essentially that. The Treasury's temporary rule adopts, with cer-
tain exceptions, the SEC rules for broker-dealers relating to custody of
securities. '
76
It is an enormous administrative convenience for the dealer when the cus-
tomer does not take possession of his securities. It reduces the dealer's trans-
action cost and also saves the investor the cost of establishing his own
account at a clearing bank. Because costs are lower, a dealer will often pay
additional interest if it retains possession. 177 An investor should look be-
yond these appealing interest rates and focus on the risk of leaving his secur-
ities with the dealer. Investors with ESM lost their money because they did
not take control of the collateral they had purchased. 178 Instead, they kept
their collateral with ESM's clearing agent in the mistaken belief that the
securities were segregated and held for their benefit. 179 Segregated accounts
might be adequate protection for investors dealing with reputable firms,
however, prior to the Act an investor could not be assured that the unregis-
tered firm with whom he was dealing was financially sound.
If an investor wishes greater protection of his securities than a segregated
account can offer, he may employ one of four additional custody arrange-
ments.' 80 Investors can require dealers to transfer or deliver the investor's
securities by having the securities deposited (1) with a trustee under a trust
receipt arrangement, (2) with a custodian bank acting as agent for both the
investor and the dealer under a tripartite agreement, (3) with a clearing firm
or bank acting as the investor's agent under an independent custodial agree-
ment, or (4) with the investor directly.' 8 '
The underlying securities can be transferred to a trustee under a trust re-
175. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (1987).
176. Temporary Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,654, 19,702 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§§ 403, 450) (effective May, 26, 1987). The temporary rule also imposes a segregation require-
ment upon depository institutions. Id. at 19,711. The Treasury stated that these modifications
should be ultimately unnecessary as the SEC adopts amendments to its rules concerning hold-
in-custody repos. Id. at 19,654; see Financial Responsibility Rules, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,295 (1987)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240).
177. ESM offered some of its clients 1/4 point more for not taking possession of their
underlying securities. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 150.
178. See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
179. See RECEIVER REPORT, supra note 100.
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ceipt arrangement.'8 2 Here, a receipt is issued by the dealer or its clearing
bank to the customer stating that specific securities are held for the cus-
tomer's account. 18 3 However, the trust arrangement is commonly used for
physical securities. 8 4 The costs of the trust arrangement, however, are often
too high for the small repo investor."8 5
One of the bailment-type custodial agreements-the tripartite repo or the
independent custodian, can be as effective as the trust arrangement. 8 6 The
costs of these agreements are not as prohibitive as the trust agreement be-
cause the dealer's reporting requirements and his duties are not as great.
18 7
Under a tripartite repo, the custodian places securities in the customer's ac-
count against funds deposited with it by the customer during the day.1
88
The following day the repo is "unwound" automatically.1 89 The custodian
polices the transaction by ensuring adequate segregation and pricing of the
repo securities.' 9 ° When the transfer of the securities is made to an in-
dependent custodian, it acts as the agent for the customer in accepting deliv-
ery of repo securities.' 9 ' The only contracting parties are the customer and
the custodian bank, unlike in the tripartite repo, where the dealer is also a
party to the contract.192 Moreover, the custodian does not police the terms
of the independent custodial repo.' 93
Some fear that serious transaction costs could be imposed upon the inves-
tor if the Treasury were to promulgate exclusive custodian guidelines for the
broker-dealers.' 94 Because no major bank offers either of the custodial
agreements on a large scale, it is difficult to determine what the costs of their
mandatory use might be. 9 5 In relation to the earnings of these repos, the
costs could significantly reduce the benefits of these transactions.'
96
182. See Porter, Retail Repurchase Agreements Revisited, 99 BANKING L.J. 676, 694
(1982).
183. BBS Hearing, supra note 9, at 258 (statement of E. Gerald Corrigan, President,
FRBNY).
184. Id.
185. See Porter, supra note 182, at 694; see also infra note 202.
186. BBS Hearing, supra note 9, at 257-59 (statement of E. Gerald Corrigan, President,
FRBNY).
187. Porter, supra note 182, at 694.




191. Id. at 259.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Letter from Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 171, at 515.
195. Id. at 516.
196. One commentator suggested that, in the extreme, these charges could cost it $25 mil-
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Transfer of Treasury securities is done through the FRB's book-entry sys-
tem over the "Fed wire."' 97 Because no physical certificate of ownership
actually exists, delivery is effected simply by a Federal Reserve bank making
an appropriate entry which properly debits and credits accounts in its
ledger.' 98 Practically speaking, direct deposit of the securities with the in-
vestor would work only if the investor or his bank has an account with the
FRBNY, as only depository institutions may maintain an account with the
FRBNY. 1 99 Because dealers engaged solely in government securities are not
depository institutions, they may not maintain an account with the
FRBNY.2° ° However, a recent FRB rule has allowed states and municipali-
ties to establish accounts with the FRBNY for safekeeping of government
securities purchased with public funds.2 °" This rule should help prevent the
losses witnessed by such municipalities as Pompano Beach, Florida,2 "2
which found it too costly to protect its interest by taking delivery through a
clearing bank.
Because of such high costs, the Treasury is also considering expanded ac-
cess to the commercial book-entry system.2 °3 This proposal would include
government securities dealers in the system, thus requiring all dealers to
have a securities account at the FRBNY.2 °4 However, some fear that a re-
quirement to deliver the collateral for all book-entry repos would increase
the volume of the FED wire significantly, thus worsening the already con-
lion annually. Id.; see BBS Hearing, supra note 9, at 300 (statement of Robert L. Pierson,
President, Fort Lee Savings & Loan) (expenses of the custodian would have eliminated the
additional yield on arbitrage transactions).
197. The Fed wire is used for "transferring reserve account balances of depository institu-
tions and government securities, as well as for transmission of Federal Reserve administrative,
supervisory, and monetary policy information." Federal Reserve Glossary, 3 Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) T 35,051, at 17,055 (May 1981).
198. 31 C.F.R. § 306.118 (1986); see M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 429-30.
199. Member banks are the only private entities that can access the FRB's book-entry
system. 31 C.F.R. § 350 (1986). Nonbank dealers, therefore, have access to the book-entry
system only through a clearing bank.
200. Id.
201. See House Hearings, supra note 95, at 364 (statement of John J. Niehenke, Acting
Assistant Secretary, Treasury) (describing the Treasury's proposed book-entry expansion); see
also US. Moves to Shield Issues Linked to Repos, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1986, at 64, col. 1;
Capital Guidelines May Be in Force Soon, J. COMMERCE, April 2, 1985, at 4A.
202. The City of Pompano Beach, Florida, found that perfecting its securities interests was
literally impossible. No New York money center bank would set up a custodian account for
Pompano Beach because of its low level of investment activities. Additionally, no local bank
possessed the expertise to offer the service. See Letter from Danny 0. Crew, supra note 97.
203. House Hearings, supra note 95, at 364 (statement of John J. Niehenke, Acting Assis-
tant Secretary, Treasury) (describing the Treasury's proposed book-entry expansion).
204. Id.
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gested system.2 ° 5
C. Further Preventive Measures
Participants in this market have at their disposal further measures to pre-
vent the loss of their investments. An additional measure of protection for
an investor is the maintenance of sufficient collateral in his repo.20 6 The
investor must obtain securities of sufficient value that equal or exceed the
value of the repurchase price, while the dealer must ensure that the value of
the securities does not significantly exceed the repurchase price.2 °7 Measur-
ing the collateral on a daily basis is referred to as "marking to market.,
218
The investor may demand that the dealer put up more collateral if the defi-
ciency is significant; conversely, the dealer may demand that the investor
return any excess collateral.2 9 Marking to market is intended to give integ-
rity to the buyer's security interests and "prevents selling repurchase agree-
ments in an amount equal to the par value of the underlying securities.
210
Investors can protect themselves against loss, if the collateral must be liqui-
dated, by carefully monitoring their investments.
In addition to maintaining sufficient collateral to avoid investment losses,
the investor should always "know [his] trading partner. ' The FRBNY
has stated that this precept was the origin of its maintaining a "surveillance"
over the primary dealers.2 12 If the FRBNY continually needs to assess the
financial strength and creditworthiness of its trading partners-among
whom are the largest and wealthiest investment institutions in the world-
clearly, smaller investors should be no less concerned about institutions with
whom they are entrusting their funds. This maxim rang true again in recent
dealer failures: 2 13 investors with BBS mistakenly thought they were dealing
with one counterparty while actually dealing with an affiliate. 214 Transac-
tions are often arranged by brokers and may involve those who are acting as
an agent for a client firm.21 5 In such circumstances, the agent's client is the
true trading partner, not the agent himself.2 6 The investor would need to
205. Letter from Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 170; see M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at
384.
206. M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 400.
207. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 114; see also M. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 350.
208. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 114.
209. Id.
210. Porter, supra note 182, at 690.
211. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 112.
212. Senate Hearing, supra note 35, at 62.
213. See supra note 13.
214. See BBS Hearing, supra note 9, at 4-26 (statement of Saul S. Cohen, Trustee).
215. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 112.
216. Id.
1987] 1021
Catholic University Law Review
know the financial data on the client firm to determine the true credit risk of
this trade.217
As stated by the FRB, the use of a written repo would further reduce the
investor's exposure to undisclosed risk.21s The endorsed agreement would
stand as some evidence of the investor's rights in protecting his invest-
ment.219 The Public Securities Association (PSA) has established a proto-
type repo with provisions such as "the criteria for both providing additional
collateral when the pledged securities fall in value, and returning excess col-
lateral when the pledged securities fall in value, and returning excess collat-
eral when the pledged securities rise in value., 22" The PSA agreement also
provides for the method of payment and delivery, requires the segregation of
collateral securities in identifiable accounts, and establishes the criteria for
default which would allow the parties to either liquidate or purchase the
collateral securities. This prototype agreement further establishes "the
rights of any trustee or custodian holding the underlying securities;.., the
description of each party when they are acting as a 'principal' or as an
'agent' for a customer; ... the counterparty's attestation to its creditworthi-
ness and the validity of financial data provided."
22 1
The Treasury has recognized the wide acceptance of the PSA's prototype
repo and now requires that an agreement be in writing and contain specific
wording. 222 In the case of a hold-in-custody arrangement, the Treasury re-
quires that the repo be explicit enough "to put the less sophisticated investor
on notice of the potential risks involved.,
223
Concededly, not every participant in this market needs, nor is able to fol-
low, all the preventive steps described. However, neither investor nor dealer
can afford to overlook at least certain preventive measures. Indeed, the sin-
gle most important safeguard an investor should observe is to understand the
risks in trading securities. By availing himself of disclosure documents and
industry guidelines, the investor can learn of these risks.2 24 No federal regu-
lation can guarantee the worth of any security transaction-that judgment is
217. Id.
218. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD SUPERVISORY POLICY ON SECURITIES LENDING
(May 6, 1985), reprinted in BBS Hearing, supra note 9, at 429.
219. Porter, supra note 75, at 370.
220. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 117-18.
221. Id.
222. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,655-56 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 403 (issued May 26,
1987)). This requirement, however, only applies to hold-in-custody repos. Id. The SEC has
also issued a customer protection rule which will require that hold-in-custody repos be in
writing. Customer Protection Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,331 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240) (effective Jan. 31, 1988).
223. 52 Fed. Reg. 5673 (1987).
224. See supra note 70.
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one reserved for each investor.225
D. ESM and BBS-Dealer Failures the Act Might Have Prevented
Some of the investors hurt in the ESM failure had allowed ESM to deposit
the securities with ESM's own clearing agent. 226 The clearing agent held
these accounts for ESM and not in segregated accounts for the investors.227
Those investors who had taken possession of the pledged securities were able
to liquidate their collateral immediately and with little or no loss. 2 2 8 Addi-
tionally, investors not only provided ESM with excess collateral, but also did
not "know their customer" in that many thought they were doing business
with an affiliate when in reality they were dealing with the parent corpora-
tion.229 Furthermore, the SEC believes that had its oversight been in effect,
it may have been able to discover much earlier the problems that led to
ESM's collapse.23°
In the BBS affair, losses linked to AMC's collapse were occasioned by
improper collateralization of repo transactions. 231 As with ESM, securities
underlying these repo transactions were not properly perfected and investors
discovered that securities underlying their transactions were pledged by
AMC in other transactions.232 Amid these double pledgings of securities,
customers would loan money and, according to practice, would not take pos-
session of the securities.2 33 Investors also sustained losses by not knowing
their counterparty.234 Many customers dealing with BBS thought they were
doing business with BBS, Inc., when actually they were dealing with
AMC.
2 35
Had the Act been in place prior to the ESM and BBS failures, much of the
abuse in this market might have been deterred or reduced.236 Nevertheless,
225. See SEC HANDBOOK, supra note 150, at 6.
226. See RECEIVER REPORT, supra note 100, at 32; see also Brannigan, ESM Group Unit
Apparently Hid Losses of as Much as $300 Million, Auditors Find, Wall St. J., Mar. 6,1985, at
6, col. 1.
227. See RECEIVER REPORT, supra note 100, at 32.
228. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 149.
229. Id. at 150.
230. See House Hearings, supra note 95, at 405 (statement of John Shad, Chairman, SEC);
see also Ingersoll, SEC Should be Empowered to Regulate U.S. Securities, Some in House Sug-
gest, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1985, at 4, col. 2.
231. See Nash, Bevill Collapse Tied to E.S.M., N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1985, at D6, col. 4.
232. See BBS Hearing, supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Saul S. Cohen, Trustee).
233. Id. at 7; see also id. at 488 (statement of Robert V. Shumway, Director, Division of
Bank Supervision, FDIC).
234. BBS Hearing, supra note 9, at 4-26 (statement by Saul S. Cohen, Trustee).
235. Id. at 14.
236. See JOINT REPORT, supra note 151, at 784.
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it is unrealistic to expect this legislation to prevent all fraud237 or all firm
failures because both can occur even under stringent regulation.238 Indeed,
the regulators themselves admit that fraud cannot be totally prevented in the
marketplace. 23 9 However, in the absence of this legislation, such fraud could
continue undetected until it is too late to prevent the investor's loss. This
Act, through its registration and disclosure provisions, will, if nothing else,
reduce the opportunities for fraud.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Government Securities Act of 1986 imposes few additional require-
ments on those dealers in government securities that are already regulated.
It will, however, fill the gaps among those dealers that were previously not
subject to any federal government controls. In general, the Act provides the
guidelines for market stability and continued liquidity, in conjunction with
increased protection for investors in the government securities market. Spe-
cifically, it authorizes the Treasury, in collaboration with the FRB and the
SEC, to adopt disclosure requirements, audit rules and regulations, capital
adequacy guidelines and account segregation or transfer rules. While the
collective efforts of these agencies should go a long way toward striking the
correct balance between competing interests in the government securities
market, common sense and appreciation of the inherent risks in the securi-
ties market are still the best guides for the investor to avoid the same pitfalls
encountered by those involved in the ESM and BBS failures.
Joseph G. Fallon
237. Id. One federal official noted that even if the fraudulent practices witnessed in the
ESM and BBS failures were eradicated, new fraudulent methods could be devised. To avoid
fraud he suggested better education of investors, good internal industry guidelines and prudent
investment. See COMMISSION PUBLIC FORUM, supra note 156, at 229-30 (statement of Ed-
ward Geng, Senior Vice President, FRBNY).
238. See Memorandum from Richard G. Ketchum to John R. Shad (Apr. 9, 1985), re-
printed in House Hearings, supra note 95, at 381.
239. See id. at 393; see also BBS Hearing, supra note 9, at 66 (statement of John R. Shad,
Chairman, SEC) (no assurance that regulations will eradicate losses); Ingersoll, SEC Should
Be Empowered to Regulate US. Securities, Some in House Suggest, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1985,
at 4, col. 2.
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